Correct but GOS reverses alot of Google patches like always on voice requires kernel privalage it is disabled on GOS etc. But kernel level signature spoofing gives way for a malicious app to spoof as micro g and infect your device and you would never know because micro g requires the same thing to function it is making itself look like Google when it is not google. So using microg opens your device up to allot more ways for it to be compromised and also makes it harder to detect or notice once it is compromised. For me the security risk of kernel level spoofing is way to high to use on a production device used everyday. Also I trust neither Google or microg I only use Foss apps I don’t have Sandboxed play services installed at all I just don’t use Google anymore.
I haven’t looked into it (because Android repos are confusing), but I assume it allows just one specific signature to spoof one other specific signature. If so then I do not see such a security issue, because it wouldn’t suddenly open this mechanism up to everyone.
Even if it would require spoofing of multiple signatures, if there is a limited list of signatures to spoof as and a whitelist of signatures for the apps that are allowed to spoof them, then it would also be limited enough, IMO.
Correct but GOS reverses alot of Google patches like always on voice requires kernel privalage it is disabled on GOS etc. But kernel level signature spoofing gives way for a malicious app to spoof as micro g and infect your device and you would never know because micro g requires the same thing to function it is making itself look like Google when it is not google. So using microg opens your device up to allot more ways for it to be compromised and also makes it harder to detect or notice once it is compromised. For me the security risk of kernel level spoofing is way to high to use on a production device used everyday. Also I trust neither Google or microg I only use Foss apps I don’t have Sandboxed play services installed at all I just don’t use Google anymore.
I haven’t looked into it (because Android repos are confusing), but I assume it allows just one specific signature to spoof one other specific signature. If so then I do not see such a security issue, because it wouldn’t suddenly open this mechanism up to everyone.
Even if it would require spoofing of multiple signatures, if there is a limited list of signatures to spoof as and a whitelist of signatures for the apps that are allowed to spoof them, then it would also be limited enough, IMO.
IIUC, you don’t need to patch LineageOS anymore for MicroG: https://github.com/lineageos4microg/android_vendor_partner_gms/blob/master/README.md#microg-mobile-services